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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is primarily to study financial volatility during the global financial crisis.
We use the largest shocks to volatility to identify the major events during the crisis, and utilize
high-frequency data to seek out their causes. Our sample spans the period from January 3rd,
1997 to December 31, 2009 that includes several major financial events, which adds perspective
to the magnitude of the global financial crisis. High-frequency data are also utilized to construct
realized measures of volatility that yields accurate measures of volatility. The relationship
between important financial/economic events and our realized measures of volatility is illustrated
in Figure 1. The figure presents the annualized realized measure of volatility for the S&P 500
index covering the period 1997-2009. Several important clusters of volatility are observed and
associated with major economic events that occurred during this period, including the Asian
crisis, the Russian crisis, the Dot-com bubble burst, 9/11, and Lehman Brothers collapse. The
highest measured value of volatility was recorded on October 10th, 2008, at 165.7 (annualized).
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Figure 1: Annualized realized volatility for the period of 1997-2009 and some of the major crises and
events.
In this paper we first utilize the recently developed Realized GARCH framework Hansen
et al. (2012) to extract daily volatilities. This framework utilizes accurate realized measures
of volatility computed from high-frequency data, that facilitates a measure of daily volatility
shocks. Because the Global Financial Crisis was an unusually volatile period, with several
unusually large shocks, we propose a new variation of the Realized GARCH model which is
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less sensitive to outliers. This variant of the model improves the empirical fit during the crisis
period. However, the improvements are modest, and it appears that the need for robustification
is less important than is the case of conventional GARCH models, see e.g. Harvey (2013, p.
13). This highlights one of the advantages of using realized measures, instead of solely relying
on daily returns, as do conventional GARCH models.
Knowledge of financial volatility has considerably increased over the last decade, revolving
around two main lines of enquiry: measuring and modeling volatility. This is in part due to the
increased availability of high-frequency financial price, which has inspired the development of
novel econometric tools that substantially improved the ex-post volatility measurement.
The impetus to the vastly growing literature on measuring volatility came largely from
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), who documented that the realized variance, computed as the
sum of squared intraday returns, provides an accurate measurement of daily volatility. The
stochastic properties of the realized variance were subsequently studied in Andersen et al. (2001),
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2002), Meddahi (2002), Andersen et al. (2003), Mykland and
Zhang (2009). In the meantime, a large number of improved proxies of volatility, which are
not sensitive to market microstructure noise were introduced by Zhang et al. (2005), Barndorff-
Nielsen et al. (2008), Hansen and Horel (2009), inter alios.
The improved measures of volatility motivated the development of volatility models that
make uses of realized measures. For instance, Engle and Gallo (2006) proposed the Multiplicative
Error Model (MEM) which jointly models returns and realized measures of volatility via a
multiple latent volatility processes framework. The MEM framework was subsequently refined
and used by Shephard and Sheppard (2010), who refers to their model as the HEAVY model.
More recently, Hansen et al. (2012), see also Hansen and Huang (2016) and Hansen et al. (2014),
introduced the Realized GARCH model that takes a different approach to the joint modeling
of returns and realized volatility measures. The key difference is the presence of a measurement
equation that ties the realized measure to the underlying conditional variance.
In this paper we propose and study a new variant of the Realized GARCH model that is
sought to be robust to outliers. The new structure is inspired by Harvey (2013) who demon-
strated that conventional GARCH models can be severely influenced by large returns with un-
fortunate empirical consequences. Harvey (2013) proceeded by proposing a score-driven model
that can overcome the problem. By restricting returns to only influence volatility through the
score of a t-distribution, the resulting impact is made robust to outliers in an intuitive manner.
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Our robustified Realized GARCH borrows the outlier dampening feature of the score.
For a more focused analysis, we zoom in on the events during the recent global crisis (2007-
2009) and analyze the days with the largest volatility shocks. We present then the main eco-
nomic/financial/social/ governmental events that could have induced these shocks. We sub-
sequently use the information in the high-frequency data to identify the exact timing of each
shock, which gives us an idea of its real cause. Interestingly, the largest volatility shock is found
to coincide with a technical problem in the trading system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the modeling framework including
the robustified Realized GARCH specification. The empirical analysis is presented in Section
3. In Section 4 we discuss the news related to the largest volatility shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modeling Framework
2.1 Key Variables
We are to study volatility of asset returns, rt. In the empirical analysis we use the exchange
traded index fund, SPY, to define daily returns because it closely tracks the S&P 500 index
and provides us with readily available high-frequency data. The conditional variance of daily
returns is denoted by:
ht = var(rt|Ft−1), (1)
where {Ft} is a filtration to which rt is adapted. Volatility shocks – the key variable in this
analysis – are defined by:
vt = E(log ht+1|Ft)− E(log ht+1|Ft−1), (2)
so that 100× vt is the percentage shock to volatility, induced by news on the tth day.
In the rest of this section we detail the econometric modeling of returns and realized measures
of volatility, which will lead to our empirical estimates of volatility shocks. After introducing the
Realized GARCH framework we detail the robustified version of the model that we introduce
in this paper. Readers who are primarily interested in the empirical analysis and less interested
in the details of the econometric models can skip the rest of this section and go directly to the
empirical analysis in Section 3.
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2.2 Realized GARCH Framework
The Realized EGARCH model of Hansen and Huang (2016) (with a single realized measure of
volatility) is given by the following three equations:
rt = µ+
√
htzt, (3)
log ht = ω + β log ht−1 + τ(zt−1) + γut−1, (4)
log xt = ξ + ϕ log ht + δ(zt) + ut, (5)
where τ(z) = τ1z+ τ2(z2−1) and δ(z) = δ1z+ δ2(z2−1). Here, zt and ut are typically assumed
to be mutually and serially independent and modeled with the specification: zt ∼ iid(0, 1) and
ut ∼ iid(0, σ2u).
The three equations are labelled as the return equation, the GARCH equation, and the
measurement equation, respectively. The first two form the basis for a GARCH-X model, similar
to that estimated by Engle (2002), Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2007), and Visser (2011).
The measurement equation is a key characteristic of the Realized GARCH framework, which ties
the (ex-post) realized measure, xt, to the latent (ex-ante) conditional variance, ht. A GARCH-X
model is – in isolation – an incomplete description of the data, because it does not specify a model
for the realized measure. A complete specification of the dynamic properties of both returns and
realized measures is achieved by means of the measurement equation. An alternative approach
to completing the GARCH-X model that involves additional latent variables was proposed by
Engle and Gallo (2006), see also Shephard and Sheppard (2010).
Some of the key features of this model are captured by β, which measures the persistence of
volatility, and by τ(zt−1) + γut−1, which estimates the innovation in the conditional volatility.
For instance, γut−1 captures the impact that the realized measure has on the next period
conditional variance. The functions τ(z) and δ(z) are called the leverage functions, as they
specify a dependence between returns and volatility commonly referred to as the leverage effect.
Hansen et al. (2012) explored different leverage functions and found a simple quadratic form to
be satisfactory in practice. We adopt the same structure in our estimation. In addition, the
term τ(z) makes reference to the news impact curve introduced by Engle and Ng (1993), which
shows how positive and negative returns impact expected future volatility.
5
2.3 Robustified Realized GARCH
Several unusually large shocks to returns and volatility occurred during the global financial
crisis. Large shocks pose challenges to conventional GARCH models, as they are highly sensitive
to large returns. This motivated Harvey (2013) to suggest a more robust dynamic structure
that utilizes the conditional scores of the model. This type of model is known as the dynamic
conditional score (DCS) or generalized autoregressive score (GAS) model, see Harvey (2013)
and Creal et al. (2012, 2013), respectively.
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Figure 2: The transformation x 7→ x/√1 + x2/d for various values of d.
We adopt some insights from Harvey (2013) by introducing parameters that serve to dampen
the impact of outliers in returns. We achieve this by substituting zt with z˜t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /dz
in the GARCH equation, where dz is a parameter to be estimated. The transformation is
illustrated in Figure 2 for different values of d. Harvey (2013) deduced the transformation
from the score function within a conventional GARCH model, where a univariate time-series of
returns are being modeled, see Appendix A for details. In the present context we are modeling
both returns and realized measures and both might be affected by outliers (i.e., outliers to
returns and outliers in the realized measures, which would translate into unusually large values
for zt and ut, respectively). Therefore, we adopt a similar adjustment of ut, which measures the
shocks to volatility, and substitute u˜t = ut/
√
1 +
(
ut/σu
)2
/du for ut in the GARCH equation.
Here, du is a second robustness parameter to be estimated, analogous to dz, and we note that
the standard Realized GARCH model emerges in the limit as dz, du →∞.
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The robustified Realized GARCH model has the following structure:
rt = µ+
√
htzt, (6)
log ht = ω + β log ht−1 + τ(z˜t−1) + γu˜t−1 (7)
log xt = ξ + ϕ log ht + δ(zt) + ut, (8)
where z˜t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /dz and u˜t = ut/
√
1 +
(
u2t /σ
2
u
)
/du, with the leverage functions given by
τ(z˜) = τ1z˜ + τ2(z˜
2 − 1) and δ(z) = δ1z + δ2(z2 − 1). Additional variants of the robust model
are estimated and compared, see Appendix B for details. In our quasi maximum likelihood
estimation we model zt and ut to be mutually and serially independent, with zt ∼ iid(0, 1) and
ut ∼ iid(0, σ2u).
Within the model defined by (6)-(8), the volatility shock which was defined in (2), vt, is in
the present model given by:
vt = τ(z˜t) + γu˜t. (9)
Therefore, the volatility shock has two components. The first component is the news impact
curve that is well known from conventional GARCH models. The second term captures the ad-
ditional information about future volatility that is embodied in the realized measure of volatility.
This term illustrates another advantage of using realized measures, as an improved measurement
of the volatility shock is made available within the Realized GARCH framework.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data Description
We use high-frequency prices for the exchange traded fund, SPY, which closely tracks the S&P
500 index. Our full sample spans the period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2009.
We follow the standard practice in the GARCH literature and model daily close-to-close
returns. The realized measure of volatility measures volatility over the part of the day where
high-frequency data is available, typically from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm, which is obviously less than
close-to-close volatility that is relevant for daily returns. Hansen et al. (2012) found that about
75% of volatility occurs during the 6.5 hours with active trading, and estimated ϕ to be very close
to one, which suggest that the realized measure is proportional to daily volatility. As our the
realized measure of volatility, xt, we adopt the realized kernel (RK) by Barndorff-Nielsen et al.
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(2008). To this end we use the Parzen kernel function and a bandwidth that ensures robustness
to market microstructure noise, using the implementation in Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2011),
which guarantees a positive estimate. The positivity is useful because we will be specifying
our model for the logarithmically transformed volatility. Prior to computing intraday returns
and realized measures, we preprocess the high-frequency data using the cleaning procedures of
Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2009). We also remove unusually quiet trading days (such as days with
limited trading hours) around Thanksgiving and Christmas in order to avoid obvious outliers
in the realized measures.
In order to quantify the volatilities using an intuitive scale, we will typically report the
conditional variance and realized measure at an annualized volatility scale. The annualized
realized volatility is defined from the realized kernel estimates by:
Rvolt =
√
250× cˆ× RKt, cˆ =
∑
t r
2
t∑
t RKt
, (10)
while the annualized conditional variance (volatility) is defined by Cvolt =
√
250× ht. The
constant cˆ adjusts for the fact that RKt measures volatility over the part of the day that high-
frequency data are available, and not the whole day. The adjustment is cˆ ' 43 because about
75% of daily volatility occurs during the hours between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm.
3.2 Estimation Results
When modeling returns with conventional GARCH models, the specification of the conditional
mean typically does not make much difference. This is also true within the Realized GARCH
framework. In the present application we have estimated models with constant µ as well as
models where µ is set to zero. The unrestricted estimate of µ is small and insignificant, and
the resulting time series for hˆt are virtually identical whether µ is estimated or simply set to
zero. The empirical results reported in this paper are for models where we have imposed the
constraint µ = 0.
Next we present estimation results for the robustified Realized GARCH model based on
daily data for the period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009. The numbers in brackets
are robust standard errors.1 We have also estimated the same specification for the full sample
period, January 3, 1997 to December 31, 2009, which results in very similar point estimates.
1Robust standard errors are computed using the sandwich estimator, see Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).
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These results are presented in Appendix B.
rt =
√
htzt,
log ht = 0.015
(0.010)
+ 0.968
(0.007)
log ht−1 + 0.377
(0.054)
u˜t−1 − 0.179
(0.017)
z˜t−1 + 0.054
(0.015)
(z˜2t−1 − 1),
log xt = −0.530
(0.082)
+ 1.020
(0.070)
log ht − 0.130
(0.016)
zt + 0.037
(0.008)
(z2t − 1) + ut,
with σˆ2u = 0.154
(0.008)
, dˆz = 30.922, dˆu = 18.137.
All key parameters are statistically significant and their signs are meaningful. For instance,
the value of the coefficient for u˜t−1 is γˆ = 0.377, which shows that the realized measure provides
an informative signal about future volatility, βˆ = 0.968 reflects the high persistence in volatility,
and ϕˆ = 1.020 suggests that the realized measure is proportional to the conditional variance.
The implication is that a fixed proportion of daily volatility occurs during the 6.5 hours that
the market is open.
Figure 3: The estimated News Impact Curves based on the Realized GARCH model (dashed) and the
robustified Realized GARCH model (solid).
The asymmetric response in volatility to return shocks (leverage effect) is encapsulated in
τˆ1 = −0.179 and δˆ1 = −0.130. The estimated response in volatility to studentized return
shocks, zt, is summarized by the news impact curve. The news impact curve is displayed in
Figure 3, for both the robustified Realized GARCH model and the Realized GARCH model.
The asymmetric response is pronounced in both models, with negative return shocks have a
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disproportionally larger impact on volatility than positive return shock of the same magnitude.
Figure 3 highlights differences between the robust and non-robust Realized GARCH model,
specifically that the former dampens the impact on volatility on days with extreme negative
returns shocks.
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Figure 4: The conditional variance (annualized volatility) estimated with the robustified Realized
GARCH model, along with makers of several major events.
The time series of the conditional variance, ht, implied by the estimated model is presented
in Figure 4 along with markers of some of the main events during the Global Financial Crisis.
The first spike in volatility was on February 27, 2007, and several other spikes in volatility
are associated with key events such as those related to Bears Stearns, the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, and the House of Representatives’ decision to reject the $700 billion banking-rescue
package, etc. We will undertake a closer investigation of the largest volatility spikes in the next
section of the paper.
The volatility shock, vt = E(log ht+1|Ft) − E(log ht+1|Ft−1) = τ(z˜t) + γu˜t, summarizes the
effect that news on day t has on expected future volatility. It can be deduced from the estimated
model using (9), and our estimates of vt are presented in Figure 5 along with daily returns. As
it turns out, the largest estimated volatility shock fell on February 27, 2007. This is partly due
to the fact that volatility was relatively low prior to this date (about 9% annualized) so that
a 126% increase in expected annualized volatility (which is what vt = 1.629 translates into)
did not bring the volatility to a record high level, but it was nevertheless the largest shock in
percentage terms. The non-robust specification has vt = 2.295 on February 27, 2007, which
10
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Figure 5: Returns, rt, and volatility shocks, vt.
translates into a 215% increase in annualized volatility.
In Figure 6 we compare the non-robust Realized GARCH model with the new specification.
The upper left panel displays the two series of ht along with the realized measure of volatility
(using an annualized scale). The two series of ht are very similar, occasionally one can see
the volatility of the non-robust specification spiking up a bit higher than that of the robust
specification. The other three panels display the same series over 3-week intervals that include
the three largest volatility shocks in our sample. Large discrepancies between the volatility
series are observed in the upper right panel following the event on February 27, 2007.
In response to the large realized measure of volatility and the negative return on February 27,
2007, we observe that the Realized GARCH reacts strongly to this news. The non-robust model
predicts volatility to be much higher than what is actually observed in the realized measure
the following day. The robust model performs better following this event, except for the second
day, March 1st, and after about a week later, the two specification produce ver similar values
for the conditional variance. Generally, we observe that the standard and the robust versions of
Realized GARCH yield similar values for the conditional variance, including during the periods
around the second and third largest volatility shocks.
In the next section we will focus on the dates with the largest volatility shocks.
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4 News Related to the Largest Volatility Shocks
In this section we undertake a more detailed study of the days during the years 2006-2009,
that we have associated with the largest volatility shocks. The positive (upwards) shocks are
typically larger than the negative (downwards) shocks in volatility, both in terms of absolute
changes and in percentages changes. Using the volatility shocks from the estimated robustified
Realized GARCH model, we zoom in on the ten largest upwards shocks, which are listed in
Table 1, and the five largest downwards volatility shocks that are listed in Table 2.
Table 1 lists the ten days with the largest positive volatility shocks along with the percentage
changes in the S&P 500 and a list of selected news stories. Similarly, Table 2 lists the five dates
with the largest percentage reduction in expected volatility. The percentages volatility shock
measures the percentage change in annualized expected volatility, as defined by 100(e
1
2vt − 1).
For the positive volatility shocks this results in shocks that ranges from 43% to 126, and the
five downwards shocks ranges from −21% to −24%. In is interesting to note that all of the ten
upwards volatility shocks are associated with large negative returns, whereas the five downwards
volatility shocks are fell on days with relatively large positive returns.
For twelve of these days in the sample (those with the seven largest positive volatility shocks,
and five largest negative volatility shocks) we present intraday high-frequency price data along
with 13 realized measures of volatility, that are each computed over 30 min intervals. The
realized measures are the simple realized variance using 1-minute returns, so that each realized
measure is computed from 30 intraday returns. The realized variances are converted in to an
annualized volatility scale, by RV 7→ √250× 13× cˆ× RV where cˆ = ∑ r2t /∑xt is the constant
defined in (10) that adjusts for the fact that the realized measures only computes volatility over
a fraction of the day. For each of the twelve days we summarize some of the main news and use
the high-frequency data to identify the key pieces of news, to the extend this is possible.
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Table 1: Dates with the ten largest upwards volatility shocks and some key news
Date Vol.
shock
rt News
20070227 126% -3.5% 1 China stock market dropped by 8.8%.
2 Freddie Mac announced tightening standards on subprime loans.
3 NYSE trading interrupted because of a computer glitch around 3:00 pm.
4 News of a suicide bombing at the entrance to the main U.S. military base in
Afghanistan during a visit by Dick Cheney, and pessimistic news on the U.S.
economic growth.
20080929 98% -8.8% 5 The House of Representatives rejected the $700 billion banking-rescue
package.
6 Wachovia announced the selling of the banking operation to Citibank.
7 The crisis has spread to the European financial system (e.g., the Icelandic
government nationalizes the bank Glitnir).
20071211 86% -2.5% 8 Fed cut the federal funds rate by 0.25% to 4.25%.
9 Large subprime losses announced by Freddie Mac.
20090210 54% -4.9% 10 Obama administration unveiled a new rescue package, which was generally
received with concerns that it would be inadequate.
11Large layoffs announced by several companies, including General Motors,
Wal-Mart Stores, UBS.
20080606 52% -3.1% 12 Unexpected large increase in May, 2008 unemployment rate announced (5.5%
up from 5.0% in previous month).
13 Bond guarantors, MBIA and Ambac, were downgraded two notches from
AAA to AA.
14 Lehman Brothers announced plans to raise $5-6 billion in fresh capital as it
disclosed a large second-quarter loss.
20080915 49% -4.7% 15 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc filed for bankruptcy protection.
16 Merrill Lynch acquired by Bank of America.
20070710 48% -1.4% 17 Standard and Poor’s Rating Services add 612 securities to the “CreditWatch
negative” list, because of high delinquency and foreclosure rates. Moody’s
Investors Service downgrade 399 securities and place an additional 32
securities on review for possible downgrade.
20070313 46% -2.0% 18 Media reports concern about subprime lending.
19 The US dollar tumbled versus other major currencies.
20071101 45% -2.6% 20 Downgrade of Citigroup.
21 Credit Suisse report a 31 percent drop in profits.
22 Exxon Mobil report a bigger-than-expected drop in quarterly earnings.
23 Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch put an estimated $70 billion worth of
collateralized debt obligations on review for downgrading.
24 Economic reports on personal income and spending, manufacturing,
foreclosure filings.
20070726 43% -2.3% 25 Wells Fargo & Co. announce that it will stop making subprime mortgages
through brokers amid escalating late payments and defaults.
26 NYSE invoke trading curbs to slow trading due to the large price changes.
27 Homebuilders post huge losses (new house sales tumbled 6.6%).
Note: Volatility shock, return on the S&P 500 index (source Yahoo Finance), and key events/news.
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Table 2: Dates with the five largest downwards volatility shocks and selected news.
Date Vol.
shock
rt News
20081013 -24% 11.6% 1 Governments to rescue banks through direct capital injections.
2 The European Central Bank attempts to revive credit market by making
unlimited euro funds available.
3 The U.S. central bank to provide unlimited dollars to the European Central
Bank, Bank of England and Swiss National Bank, allowing them to relieve
pressures on commercial banks across their regions.
20091109 -23% 2.2% 4 Finance ministers of the G-20 met over the weekend and pledged to keep the
economic stimulus in place.
20071113 -21% 2.9% 5 Positive statements from CEOs of Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan.
6 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., report higher that expected third-quarter earnings.
7 Oil price retreats from near high record levels.
8 Home sales index (for September, 2007) released in the afternoon. PHSI up
0.2% beating expectations of -2.5%.
20080930 -21% 5.4% 9 Decline in volatility is mainly due to the spike in volatility on the preceding
day, that resulted from Congress’s rejection of the banking-rescue package.
20071221 -21% 1.7% 10 The Federal Reserve announced it had lent $20 billion to banks in order to
support the credit markets.
11 The “Super SIV” rescue fund was canceled as the consortium claimed that
“[it] is not needed at this time”.
12 Encouraging economic news about personal income and spending.
Note: Volatility shock, return on the S&P 500 index (source Yahoo Finance), and key events/news.
Tuesday, February 27, 2007 (+126%)
February 27, 2007 corresponds to the largest volatility shock in our sample, with a volatility
shock vt = 1.629 that translates into an expected 126% increase in volatility. On this day, the
Dow Jones industrial average fell 416.02 points, which was the largest drop since 9/11, and the
S&P 500 and Nasdaq fell by about 3.5% and 3.9%, respectively.
There where several potentially distressing news stories by the time the (US) markets opened.
The Chinese stock market had crashes, there where pessimistic news on the U.S. economic
growth (e.g., on Monday, the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan announced a potential
fall of the economy into a recession by the end of 2007; report on the decline in the durable
goods orders in January and on housing prices, etc.), and the U.S. military base in Afghanistan,
which Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting, was attacked by a suicide bomber. Moreover,
Freddie Mac announced tighter standards on subprime loans.
The subprime related news story from Freddie Mac is unlikely to have been of major sig-
nificance to the market turmoil, because the tighter standards were only to be put into effect
starting September 1, 2007. The Chinese crash is more likely to have been a contributing factor,
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as the Shanghai Composite Index had fallen -8.5%, allegedly caused by fears of new regulatory
measures, such as possible trading taxes. However, this explanation also seems implausible
when we turn to the evidence offered by high-frequency data.
Figure 7: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – February 27, 2007
Figure 7 presents the high-frequency prices (minute-by-minute) on the SPY along with
realized variances computed over 30 minute intervals. It is evident that markets were not
particularly disturbed by any of these news stories, including the Chinese crash. What stands
out on this day is the increased price fluctuations that begins shortly before 15:00, causing
volatility to jump by a factor of eight over a short period of time. This timing coincides with
a computer glitch in the trading system. The glitch caused some trades not to be reported
immediately, such that posted prices became stale. According to the Dow Jones spokeswoman:
“around 2:00 pm [on that day] the market’s extraordinary heavy trading volume caused a delay
in the Dow Jones data systems. [...] and as we identified the problem we decided to switch
to a back-up system and the result was a rapid catch-up in the published value of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average.” The back-up system was activated around 3:00 pm and at 3:02 pm
the index fell by 160 points and continued its depreciation throughout the afternoon. The Dow
Jones Industrial average index fell by 546 points in the afternoon. The data for this day provides
an excellent example of the valuable information that high-frequency data can offer, and shows
that high-frequency data are essential for correctly pinpointing the news events that were the
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main sources for the market turmoil.
Tuesday, July 10, 2007 (+48%)
Figure 8: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – July 10, 2007
On 10 July 2007 the rating agencies cut the rating for several subprime bond. Standard and
Poor’s placed 612 securities backed by subprime mortgages on “CreditWatch negative”. These
612 securities made up about 2 percent of all residential mortgage-backed securities in the US.
Delinquencies exceeded historical norms by a wide margin and occurred at higher rates than the
agency previously expected. This directly affected Bear Sterns, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Merrill
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, which held a large amount of these securities in their portfolio. The
same day, Moody’s downgraded 399 securities and placed additional 32 on review for possible
downgrade.
It was evident that these downgrades could have significant implications for the housing
market, because borrowers with subprime adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans, would face
difficulties refinancing their loans at an increased interest rates. Stricter underwriting standards
made even more difficult for borrowers to refinance out of unaffordable ARMs, and the falling
prices in the housing market placed an increasing number of borrowers “under water”.
Standard and Poor cited findings by Mortgage Asset Research Institute (MARI) as one of the
reasons for the downgrades. MARI had reported a high incidence of fraud in loan applications,
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such as false or unsubstantiated claims about income, assets, and employment. Affected loans
were known as “liar loans”.
Tuesday, November 13, 2007 (-21%)
On November 13, 2007 the Dow rose by about 320 points. Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan
were up 8.5% and 6.2%, respectively, after Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, said that
the company would not suffer further significant losses related to subprime mortgages, and JP
Morgan CEO, Jamie Dimon, downplayed its exposure to subprime debt. Other good news
included Wal-Mart reporting higher that expected third-quarter earnings along with a positive
outlook, and oil prices fell (U.S. light crude oil for December delivery fell by $3.45).
Another, significant news story was a 0.2% increase in the US Pending Home Sales (Septem-
ber, 2007), which was substantially better than the forecast of -2.5% and the -6.5% decline in
US Pending Home Sales for the previous month. The release of this story coincide with the
afternoon rally in the marked on this date.
Figure 9: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – November 13, 2007
Tuesday, December 11, 2007 (+86%)
On December 11, 2007, the S&P 500 index fell by 2.5%, while the Dow Jones industrial average
lost 294 points, or 2.1%, and Nasdaq lost 2.5%. The markets were relatively calm in the morning
and the market was up until about 14:15, when it suddenly went in to a tailspin while volatility
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jumped from about 10% to 70% (at an annualized rate). The main news stories of the day were
related to the FOMC meeting that resulted in a 25 b.p. reduction of the Fed Funds Rate to
4.25%, which was announced at 14:15. Other news that morning included the CEO of Freddie
Mac, Richard Syron, announcing that Freddie Mac would loose an additional $5.5 billion to
$7.5 billion on top of the $4.5 billion losses projected previously.
From Figure 10 it is evident that the FOMC announcement triggered the falling prices in
the afternoon. The market had expected reduction of the FFR by 50 b.p. and the surprise had
an instant market impact that increases volatility for the remainder of the day, see Birru and
Figlewski (2010).
Figure 10: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – December 11, 2007
19
Friday, December 21, 2007 (-21%)
Figure 11: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – December 21, 2007
Stocks rose early on December 21, 2007 until the announcement that Merrill Lynch, which was
deeply affected by the credit crisis, was in negotiations with Temasek Holdings (a Singapore’s
state investment firm) to sell a part of Merrill Lynch. In addition, the Wall Street Journal
reported impressive earnings from BlackBerry maker Research in Motion. As a consequence,
the Dow Jones industrial average had gained about 1.2% during the first hour of trading, S&P
500 index gained 1.3%, and Nasdaq climbed about 1.3%.
In the afternoon on December 21, 2007 it was announced that the plans for a Super SIV
(structured investment vehicle) were abandoned. The announcement was followed by the state-
ment that “it is not needed at this time”, which the markets may have viewed as good news. The
Super SIV, formally named Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, was intended to resolve
liquidity problems that would otherwise cause fire sales of the SIVs assets. Short term financing
was increasingly becoming difficult due to market concerns over the SIVs exposure to subprime
mortgages. The consortium behind the Super SIV included major financial institutions, includ-
ing Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wachovia, and Fidelity. The Super SIV was
backed by the Treasury Department but critics, including former Federal Reserve chief, Alan
Greenspan, claimed that the Super SIV was a bailout of banks, and that it would do more harm
than good.
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Friday, June 6, 2008 (+52%)
Figure 12: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – June 6, 2008
Early in the morning, Dow, Nasdaq and S&P were down after the May jobs report announced
the biggest surge in unemployment since 1986. The unemployment rate increased to 5.5% from
5.0% in April, greatly exceeding the expected rise to 5.1%. The jobs report came on the same
day that oil prices jumped to $134 as the dollar lost value against the euro and the yen. It
also comes the day after S&P decided to cut the AAA rating of the two largest bond insurers,
MBIA (the world’s largest bond insurer) and Ambac (the second largest insurer). Moreover,
S&P warned that additional downgrades were possible, in anticipation of further losses from
mortgage backed securities. MBIA and Ambac ratings were downgraded two notches from AAA
to AA, which leads to stricter capital requirement.
On that day, the Dow Jones industrial average lost 395 points, or 3.1%, its biggest one day
decline since the start of the subprime mortgage crisis (February, 2007).
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Figure 13: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility — September 15, 2008
Monday, September 15, 2008 (+49%)
On September 15, 2008 the Dow Jones industrial average index fell by 504.49 points (-4.4%),
which was the largest decline since 9/11. The day followed the weekend where Lehman Brothers
filed for bankruptcy protection, which was the largest bankruptcy proceeding in the United
States history. The failure of Lehman Brothers made the severity of the crisis crystal clear,
and strengthen the fears that the crisis was systemic and would spread throughout the financial
sector and beyond. Merrill Lynch was also severely distressed, but did not file for bankruptcy
because Bank of America agreed to purchase Merrill Lynch for $50 billion in stock.
In an attempt to counter these events, the Federal Reserve doubled the size of its Term
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) program to $200 billion and widened the asset group eligible
as collateral for Treasury loans. In an attempt to dampen the extend to which the financial
turmoil would spread to Europe, the European Central Bank and Bank of England injected
€30 billion and £5 billion of capital, respectively.
Monday, September 29, 2008 (+98%)
The second largest volatility shock occurred on September 29, 2008. As shown in Figure 14,
prices plunged significantly in the afternoon between 1:30 pm and 1:45 pm. At that time, the
House of Representatives rejected (with a 228-205 vote) the Emergency Economic Stabilization
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Act of 2008, which triggered a tailspin in the stock market. The banking rescue package was to
authorize the Treasure to spend up to $700 billion for purchasing toxic assets, mainly mortgage-
backed securities, and supply cash directly to banks. By the end of the day, the Dow had fallen
by 777 points – the largest drop in the history – while the S&P 500 index was down by 8.8% -
its largest percentage drop since the crash of ’87.
Figure 14: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility — September 29, 2008
There was other news on September 29, 2008, that may have contributed to the market
turmoil, albeit to a lesser extend. Wachovia announced it was selling its banking operation to
Citigroup, and while Wachovia shares lost 81% of their value in the afternoon, Citigroup lost
about 12%. The British government nationalized the mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley PLC
and some European banks collapsed. The German commercial property lender Hypo Real Estate
Group made use of a government-facilitated credit line, due to difficulties in the international
credit market. The government of Iceland took control of Glitnir, the country’s third largest
bank, to prevent its collapse. Moreover, over the weekend, Fortis was partially nationalized,
receiving € 11.2 billion capital injection from the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
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Figure 15: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – September 30, 2008
Tuesday, September 30, 2008 (-21%)
Stock prices rebounded the day after the Congress failed to pass the government’s $700 billion
rescue plan. The DJIA increased by 485 points that partially reversed the 777 points decline
on the previous day. The Standard & Poor’s 500 index and the Nasdaq composite both gained
about 5%. Most of the rebound occurred late in the day after the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation announced an enhanced deposit insurance with increased limits, a move that was
supported by both presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain.
Monday, October 13, 2008 (-24%)
Stock markets around the world rallied the day in response to several new policies introduced by
the US and European Government. The US stock markets increased, after the Europe markets
that increased earlier in the day: London’s FTSE 100 was up 4.9%, the CAC 40 in Paris was
up 6.9%, and the DAX in Frankfurt, Germany, was up 8.0%.
The leaders of 15 European nations gathered in Paris at a first formal meeting, since the
launch of the Euro currency in 1999. Their main goal was to adopt measures to combat credit
crisis in Europe. The meeting was organized around four panel discussions on the following
themes: i) facilitating the access of banks to capital resources such as to continue the proper
financing of the economy; ii) global plans for governments to rescue banks through direct capital
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injections (such as buying soured mortgage assets from banks, injections of capital, etc.); iii) an
efficient recapitalization of distressed banks and other appropriate means to support the banking
system on the road to recovery; iv) urging regulators to ease the “mark-to-market” accounting
requirements based on the evaluation of assets at their current price. There was agreement to
act together in a comprehensive wide ranging plan to rescue the troubled banking system by
adding capital through investment and by guaranteeing inter bank lending.
Shortly before stocks started trading on October 13, 2008, the British Treasury announced
the investment of $63 billion in three major banks, Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS, and Lloyds
TSB. Other positive news included an unprecedented move by the Federal Reserve Bank, which
announcing that an unlimited amount of dollars would be available to the central banks: Bank
of England, European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank.
Figure 16: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – October 13, 2008
The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, committed €360 billion in liquidity to French banks,
the German government announced a rescue package worth of $671 billion and the prime minister
of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, announced that Spain would provide up to €100 billion
of guarantees for new debt issued by commercial banks in 2008. Moreover, in coordination
with other eurozone countries, the Dutch government guaranteed interbank lending up to €200
billion. The European Central Bank committed weekly injections of unlimited euro funds at an
interest rate of 3.75%.
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Figure 17: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility - February 10, 2009
Tuesday, February 10, 2009 (+54%)
The day began on an optimistic tone in anticipation of the new Financial Stability Plan, that
was to replace the original Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The plan was detailed by
the US Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, shortly after 11:00 am and had three parts:
i) the reinforcement of the stress testing procedures within each banking institution; ii) the
development of a new Public-Private Investment Fund, which would provide government capital
and government financing helping hence to the recovery of private markets; iii) the revival of the
secondary lending markets by a commitment (together with Federal Reserve) up to a a trillion
dollars to support a Consumer and Business Lending Initiative.
Nevertheless, the new rescue plan failed to reassure investors, which was received as “a huge
disappointment”, because it lacked specific details. As a result, the stocks fell during and after
Geithner’s speech. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 382 points (4.6%), which continued in
the afternoon. The Standard & Poor’s 500 index lost 43 points, or 4.9%. The Nasdaq composite
lost 66 points, or 4.2%.
Besides the speech by Geithner, there was bad news from several large companies. General
Motors announced it would cut 14% of its workforce around the world, and cut salaries of
remaining employees. Wal-Mart Stores was to layoff 800 workers and UBS 2000 workers, after
announcing a $17 billion loss during the last quarter of 2008.
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Figure 18: Intraday prices and the realized measure of volatility – November 9, 2009
Monday, November 9, 2009 (-23%)
On November 9, 2009, stocks prices rose while volatility fell in response to an announcement
made by the Group of 20 that met over the weekend and confirmed they would keep economic
stimulus in place, including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which is also
known as the Obama Stimulus Plan. This economic stimulus plan refers to the $787 billion plan
approved by Congress in February, 2009, which was mainly devoted to tax cuts, unemployment
benefits, and job creation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed volatility during the financial crisis. We have used high frequency
data in two ways to identify the largest volatility shocks and the possible events that caused
them. First, we used high frequency data to compute realized measures of volatility and the
Realized GARCH model to identify the days with the largest volatility shocks. Second, having
identified the days with the largest volatility shocks, we used intraday high-frequency data to
pinpoint the exact timing of these shocks, to the extend this was possible. By comparing a
specific events and news announcements with the fluctuations observed in the high frequency
data, we were in many cases able to identify the main culprits for the volatility shocks.
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As an econometric contributions we propose a new variant of the Realized GARCH model,
which is sought to be more robust to outliers. The modification is inspired by Harvey (2013),
from whom we adopt a simple transformation that dampens the influence of the outliers on the
volatility dynamics. The robustified Realized GARCH improves the empirical fit in terms of the
log-likelihood function, but the gains are modest and a rigorous comparison is made difficult
by the fact that outliers are rare. So the difference in empirical fit is mainly driven by a few
observations.
From the estimated model it is straightforward to extract the volatility shock. The volatility
shock measures how much the expectation about future volatility changes in response to news
on a given day. We proceeded with a detailed analysis of the days with the largest shocks, and
used high-frequency data to identify the exact time that some of the shock occurred, which
made it possible to relate to specific events and news stories.
The largest upwards volatility shocks coincided with days with large negative returns,
whereas the largest downwards volatility shocks occurred on days with positive returns. The
days with large decline in volatility could in many cases be associated with government in-
terventions. The single largest volatility shock in our sample occurred on February 27, 2007,
which was during a relatively calm period with a low level of volatile. This day provides a
good example of the benefits of using high-frequency data. There were several major events on
February 27, 2007, including a crash on teh Chinese stock market and Freddie Mac announcing
tighter standards on subprime loans. However, high-frequency data reveal that the volatility
shock is mainly caused by a computer glitch in the trading system (just before 3 pm). Without
high-frequency data, the relevance of other events might have been overestimated.
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A Motivating the Robustified Structure
The structure of score-driven models, see Creal et al. (2012, 2013) and Harvey (2013), is mo-
tivated by the first order conditions that the true parameter values ought to satisfy. Consider
the following example where y = σz with z ∼ td, and σ > 0 being an unknown scale parameter.
If we reparameterize the model with λ = log σ2, then the log-likelihood function is
`(λ) = −12λ+ cd − d+12 log(1 + e−λ y
2
d ),
where cd = log[Γ(d+12 )/Γ(
d+1
2 )/
√
dpi]. The score is therefore
s(λ) = −12 + d+12
e−λ y
2
d
1 + e−λ y
2
d
= −1
2
(
1−
d+1
d z
2
1 + z2/d
)
' 1
2
(
z˜2 − 1) , with z˜ = z/√1 + z2/d.
A positive value of s(λ) is a signal that the expected log-likelihood may be improved by increasing
the value of λ. Similarly, s(λ) < 0 is an indication that a smaller value of λ may improve the
objective. In a time series context, with time varying parameters, z˜2t −1 > 0 becomes a signal to
increase λt = log σ2t , whereas z˜2t −1 < 0 is an indication that λt should be lowered. Precisely how
much the parameter, λt, ought to be changed is less obvious, but a simple starting point is to use
a simple autoregressive structure such as λt = ω+βλt−1 +αs(yt−1). In the robustified Realized
GARCH framework we also want to allow for leverage effects, which is the reason we adopt the
specification τ(z˜t) = τ1z˜t + τ2(z˜2t − 1). This structure, which includes a linear term, τ1z˜t, in
addition to the score-motivated term, τ2(z˜2t −1), is identical to that in Hansen et al. (2012) with
the exception that z˜t has replaced zt. In our model we maintain the Gaussian distributional
specification, and merely use z˜ = z/
√
1 + z2/d to reduce the influence of outliers. A fully-
fledged DCS/GAS structure is not needed in order to gain the robustness we seek. Adopting
t-distributions for zt and ut is relatively straightforward, but would be computationally more
cumbersome.
B Additional Empirical Results
B.1 Estimated from Large Sample: January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2009.
The empirical results for daily SPY close-to-close returns for the full sample period (January 3,
1997 to December 31, 2009) are:
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rt =
√
htzt,
log ht = 0.010
(0.004)
+ 0.968
(0.004)
log ht−1 + 0.325
(0.037)
u˜t−1 − 0.146
(0.009)
z˜t−1 + 0.044
(0.008)
(z˜2t−1 − 1),
log xt = −0.414
(0.038)
+ 1.037
(0.048)
log ht − 0.133
(0.009)
zt + 0.044
(0.006)
(z2t − 1) + ut,
with σˆ2u = 0.168
(0.006)
, dˆz = 81.552, dˆu = 6.288.
B.2 Comparison of Different Robust Specifications
We explored a range of specifications in relation to the robustness. All models can be expressed
as submodels of:
rt = µ+
√
htzt,
log ht = ω + β log ht−1 + τ(z˜1,t−1) + γu˜t−1, τ(z) = τ1z + τ2(z2 − 1),
log xt = ξ + ϕ log ht + δ(z˜2,t) + ut, δ(z) = δ1z + δ2(z
2 − 1).
The structure for each of the models is as follows, where M0 is the Realized GARCH model,
M5 is the specification used in the paper, and M6 is the most general specification:
M0: zt = z˜1,t = z˜2,t and ut = u˜t
M1: zt = z˜1,t = z˜2,t, and u˜t = ut/
√
1 + (ut/σu)2/du.
M2: z˜1,t = z˜2,t = z˜t with z˜t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /dz and ut = u˜t.
M3: z˜1,t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /d1z, z˜2,t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /d2z, and ut = u˜t.
M4: zt = z2,t, z˜1,t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /dz and ut = u˜t.
M5: zt = z2,t, z˜1,t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /dz and u˜t = ut/
√
1 + (ut/σu)2/du.
M6: z˜1,t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /dz z˜2,t = zt/
√
1 + z2t /d2z, and u˜t = ut/
√
1 + (ut/σu)2/du.
The empirical results are presented in Table 3. As previously noted, the robustified Realized
GARCH model controls the impact of jumps on volatility and on the realized measure. This
can be done in a variety of ways, and each of the seven models has a degree of robustness. M6
has the most flexible specification and M0 is the original specification without robustness.
In this section we shed light on the robustified Realized GARCH structure (both general
and simplified forms) and subsequently compare its performances in terms of empirical fit with
those of the standard Realized GARCH. To this end, we estimate the various specifications with
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robustness (M1-M6) and compare them to the standard Realized GARCH model (M0). The
empirical results for the sample period 2006 to 2009 are presented in Table 3.
The highest value of the log-likelihood is obviously achieved by the most general specification,
M6, albeit it is closely followed by M5, and the difference between these two models is not
statistically significant. Moreover, the new parameter of the transformed innovation term that
appears into the measurement equation of M6 is quite large, which suggest that z˜2,t = zt might
be reasonable. My adopting the model M5, we are only introducing robustness to outliers
in the GARCH equation, while leaving the measurement equation unchanged. The estimated
parameter associated with the number of degrees of freedom appearing in the transformed
innovation term u˜t (du = 18.14) is lower than that associated with z˜1,t (d1,z = 30.92), which
suggests that the influence of the outliers related to the realized volatility series requires the
highest extend of dampening. The log-likelihood for M5 is six units greater than the classical
Realized GARCH specification, which measures a statistical benefit of incorporating robustness
in the GARCH equation.
Table 3: Parameter estimates for each of the seven model specifications: The Realized GARCH
model (M0) and the six robustified models
M0
Realized
GARCH
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(Preferred)
M6
d1z 63.536 29.488 33.359 30.922 24.698
d2z 63.536 290.770 290.787
du 12.766 18.137 5.891
h0 0.797 0.812 0.782 0.797 0.803 0.813 0.820
ω 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.018
β 0.972 0.972 0.971 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.969
γ 0.368 0.402 0.364 0.354 0.351 0.377 0.411
τ1 -0.171 -0.171 -0.177 -0.180 -0.178 -0.179 -0.183
τ2 0.025 0.025 0.043 0.056 0.053 0.054 0.059
ξ -0.518 -0.519 -0.516 -0.528 -0.531 -0.530 -0.529
ϕ 1.006 1.005 0.994 1.014 1.022 1.020 1.012
δ1 -0.128 -0.129 -0.133 -0.130 -0.129 -0.130 -0.133
δ2 0.037 0.036 0.052 0.042 0.038 0.037 0.040
σ2u 0.157 0.157 0.156 0.154 0.155 0.154 0.154
AIC 4026.1 4026.3 4024.9 4020.1 4019.2 4018.4 4018.3
BIC 4080.0 4085.1 4088.6 4083.8 4078.0 4082.1 4086.9
-logL 2002.1 2001.2 1999.5 1997.0 1997.6 1996.2 1995.1
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Table 4 reports the values of the ten largest positive volatility shocks along with the corre-
sponding dates of occurrence, for each of the seven estimated models. The model are largely in
agreement about the dates on which the largest volatility shocks occurred on, but the estimated
magnitude of the volatility shocks differs. The dampening effect of outliers are evident from
the estimated value of vt, but it is effectively only the three largest volatility shocks that are
substantially smaller for the robustified specifications.
Table 4: Ten largest positive volatility shocks for each of the seven specifications
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Date vt Date vt Date vt Date vt Date vt Date vt Date vt
20070227 2.295 20070227 2.310 20070227 2.201 20070227 1.666 20070227 1.648 20070227 1.629 20070227 1.584
20080929 1.314 20080929 1.281 20080929 1.393 20080929 1.383 20080929 1.388 20080929 1.364 20080929 1.305
20071211 1.213 20071211 1.167 20071211 1.280 20071211 1.271 20071211 1.271 20071211 1.239 20071211 1.187
20080606 0.791 20080606 0.787 20080606 0.845 20090210 0.879 20090210 0.877 20090210 0.868 20090210 0.849
20090210 0.779 20090210 0.762 20090210 0.832 20080606 0.840 20080606 0.841 20080606 0.839 20080606 0.828
20070726 0.731 20080915 0.700 20080915 0.763 20080915 0.804 20080915 0.803 20080915 0.804 20080915 0.801
20080915 0.705 20070710 0.696 20070726 0.759 20070710 0.784 20070710 0.777 20070710 0.779 20070710 0.775
20070710 0.701 20070726 0.687 20070710 0.752 20070726 0.778 20070726 0.776 20070313 0.758 20070313 0.756
20070313 0.662 20070313 0.659 20070313 0.720 20070313 0.757 20070313 0.752 20070726 0.743 20071101 0.724
20071101 0.638 20071101 0.640 20071101 0.686 20071101 0.713 20071101 0.710 20071101 0.716 20070726 0.708
Note: This table presents the ten largest positive volatility shocks computed as vt = τ(z˜t) + γu˜t, along with the corre-
sponding dates of occurrence.
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